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Tamás Bánfi 
Fair tax (system) or ethical taxpayer? 
 
An interpretation of fairness (equity) based on the equal sacrifice principle is not clear; three 
taxation rules can be derived from it. Instead of searching for a fair tax system, the ethical 
behavior of taxpayers should be set as target and expected. Ethical taxation can be 
encouraged and propensity to pay taxes could be reinforced by abolishing the secrecy of 
individual and family tax returns, setting restrictions on cash operations which are associated 
with corruption, and gradually eliminating the tax havens and offshore areas. 
 
1. Brief theoretical history 
 
Literature studying the general government and tax system in the narrow sense essentially 
describes the basic characteristics of the tax system in identical, but at least similar terms. 
Any differences are related perhaps to the order and the narrower or broader expression of the 
various criteria. Stiglitz (2000) lists five basic characteristics. A tax system must be 
economically efficient, simple and cheap, flexible, politically responsive and fair. 
 
Of the characteristics of the tax system, probably equity, or fairness was the oldest 
requirement ever raised. Two authors are frequently opposed to Adam Smith: Montesquieu 
(1833) and Say (1803), who argued for progressive tax on the grounds of fairness. Adam 
Smith’s position divides the opinions depending on whether they intend to justify a pro or 
contra progressive taxation stance; contradictory ideas have formed about him. A typical 
position is the French author traditionally seen as a classic of the theory of finances (Leroy-
Beaulieu, 1879) who categorically rejects any interpretation of Adam Smith as a promoter of 
progressive taxation. In Hungarian economic literature, the first to raise a demand for the fair 
distribution of the tax burden was Károly Balás, albeit he always used the term fair in 
quotation marks.  
During the last two decades of the 20th century, the key personalities in public finances and 
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tax theory, Musgrave (1984) and Stiglitz (2000) used the requirement of equity and fairness 
as a criterion of the tax system as synonyms. There is a broad consensus that fairness, one of 
the basic characteristics, is not clear even theoretically and this is not corrected by 
distinguishing a horizontal and a vertical fairness either. The fact that the problem is not 
solved is reflected in Stiglitz’s opinion who “lightly chats” through nearly a whole page when 
ending the sub-chapter “What economists can contribute to discussions of fairness”, stating 
that “we can attempt to distinguish those cases where the term “fairness” is used simply to 
cover up a group’s pursuit of self-interest from those cases where some reasonable ethical or 
philosophical position underlies individuals’ claims.” (Stiglitz, 2000. p. 420)  
Is it possible that fairness, equity, righteousness (all the three terms used with a similar 
meaning, as synonyms) are terms which cannot be associated with any category in market 
economy and instead, the social interest should be approached from another direction, with 
another concept?  
 
2. Equal sacrifice principle - three different interpretations 
Justice and equity are probably among the most beautiful terms and every human can be 
assumed to have an emotional attitude towards them. Their meaning and substance according 
to the dictionaries can be various; but the interpretation based on the individual’s emotional 
approach can be diverse even within the same linguistic meaning. There is no proof to this 
extent, but we can cautiously state that the concept of equity cannot be extended to the 
functioning of economy and the elements of the economic system, or, as you choose, 
extending it to them is not advisable. 
A traditional starting point in defining the fair tax (system) could be the ability to bear public 
burden. According to a claim phrased after a review of theoretical history, “the only globally 
applicable criterion of fairness is the principle of the ability to bear public burden (equal 
sacrifice)” (Balogh, 2013). True, but after this concise finding we should also bring up the 
opinion of the German economist Brümmerhoff, who suggests that three taxation rules could 
be derived from the principle of equal sacrifice1. The three different rules affect taxpayers to 
                                                 
1 Brümmerhoff finds three different acceptable taxation solutions based on the equal sacrifice principle, 
assuming the same usefulness function. Brümmerhoff’s merit lies in describing the problem accurately. The 
3 
 
extremely different extents. Take 
 U(Y) – utility of income 
 U(Y-T) – utility of income after taxes 
According to the equal absolute sacrifice 
 U(Y) – U(Y – T) = constant 
then the lump-sum tax or the single-rate tax is advised; 
According to the equal relative sacrifice 
 = constant 
 
then the single-rate or progressive tax is the reasonable approach (Cullis John-Jones, 2003). 
According to the equal marginal sacrifice 
 U’(Y – T) = constant 
then the better approach is progressive tax. 
Clearly the principle of equal sacrifice can be interpreted in three different ways which allow 
at least three different taxation techniques. 
This causes the principle of equity to be meaningless in the case of a concrete tax. It could be 
assumed that the interpretation is possible taking taxes as a whole, albeit not in the case of 
individual tax types i.e. the concrete tax system of a concrete country could meet the equity 
criterion. This assumption must be rejected as well, because the liability of taxpayers by tax 
type is known when the tax system is established and it is not a rare thing to have one tax 
type associated with one taxpayer. (In 2014, Hungary used 55 tax types, duties not included.) 
The equity criterion based on the principle of equal sacrifice could refer to a certain tax type 
or the tax system as a whole (all the tax types), but the possibility of multiple interpretations 
offers us no clear answer. 
                                                                                                                                                        
various possibilities of interpretation had been suggested by several authors discussing the theoretical 
aspects of taxation. 
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If three different interpretations are possible, a decision should be made on which direction is 
the equitable (or more equitable) one. A theoretical decision is impossible, and in lack of one, 
the individual and group interests are the rules of the game in practice. 
If a concrete tax type and the tax system as a whole cannot be judged based on the equity 
principle, in lack of other possibilities, the criterion which expresses the social interests and 
follows them can and should be defined for the taxpayers. 
The taxpayer can be the individual (the citizen), the family (household) and the various forms 
of associations. In practice, tax liability is stipulated by law2. It is not unrealistic to assume 
that the whole of statutory taxes (the tax system) is a clear instruction to the taxpayer to 
assess the tax liability, to declare it and to pay it. To put it briefly and more simply: the 
taxpayer or its representative can calculate the amount of the tax liability. It can also be 
assumed that as part of governmental planning, the state budget is prepared based on the 
sufficiency of funds principle i.e. considering the size of the targeted balance, the tax laws 
proposed, then adopted by the Parliament ensure the revenue necessary for financing the 
costs. 
If real economy, income and consumption forecasts are close to the factual data within the 
acceptable margin of error, then the actual size of revenue and the real position of public 
finance will depend on the “willingness” of individuals, households and businesses obligated 
to pay tax to actually pay the tax. 
Can the tax “willingness” be shaped? If yes, then strengthening it can be designated as the 
key financial policy goal for society’s and economy’s sake. If not, a new system based on 
new concepts must be invented. The possibility that “willingness” variable by country can be 
observed does not rule out that it can be changed and, in particular, strengthened, but rather 
allows it. If there is a possibility, then the tools facilitating the strengthening of the taxpayers’ 
“willingness” to pay tax must be found and applied.  
 
 
                                                 
2 A counterargument at hand is that the Islamic religion imposes a tax representing mandatory alms-giving, 
customarily 2.5% of the value of land owned, wealth and income, if the Muslim believer has no debt for at 
least one year. The counterargument is questionable, as Islam postulates the identity of the Muslim 
community and the state, and the so-called sharia is a state and religious code at the same time. 
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3. Seek ethical taxpayers instead of seeking a fair tax system 
After the lengthy introduction and before recommending the incentive tools, it is essential to 
tackle the aspect which is assumed to be secondary for practical purposes i.e. how the 
“acceptable taxpaying willingness” can be approached and interpreted. As the ethical 
approach gains more ground in economy, including finances as a whole, it would be 
unjustified to leave out taxation from its scope. The definition rephrased according to the 
bygone ethical philosophers, especially Kant3, is applicable to taxpayers, too: an ethical 
action is a solidary and rational action of the free man’s will, considering the limited nature of 
goods and time (A. Bánfi, 2013). Two attributes of the ethical taxpayer should be highlighted 
in this definition. Solidarity means solidarity with taxpayers who pay less tax from their 
lower income (unemployed, unable to work) than would result from the share in the common 
social consumption (especially health and education consumption). Rationality is the 
consideration and acceptance of long-term aspects which point beyond the momentary 
interests (redistribution attenuating poverty helps maintain public safety, so extra funds for 
increasing safety are not necessary). 
An ethical taxpayer thinks according to the legislator’s intention and acts upon the law. The 
ethical taxpayer concept rules out tax avoidance and tax optimization. Employing tax 
consultants may be justified by a complex tax system, but there can be no argument for tax 
consultants’ aiding the tax evaders and tax optimizers instead of the ethical taxpayers. 
Improving the taxpayers’ tax morale and changing them into ethical taxpayers is not a simple 
tax, but it is not impossible either. A few general aspects: 
 The simplest possible tax system should be established. Existing tax systems are not 
only complicated, but unnecessarily complicated. The government intends to achieve 
its purposes, or at least part of them, through the tax system, so other goals besides 
having sufficient funds are integrated as well (Kürthy, 2010). All this is not necessary, 
because the ethical, the fairness, and economic growth aspects can be approached 
                                                 
3    A long list of Greek, British, French, and German moral philosophers attests  to the age-long scientific 
history of ethics. Plato (The Republic, 370 BC), Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics,  after 322 BC) were the 
beginning, followed later by the British Joseph Butler, with particular emphasis on Adam Smith (Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. 1750), Thomas Reid, David Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature. 1740) John Stuart Mill 
(On Liberty. 1859; Utilitarianism. 1862), Jeremy Bentham (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation. 1789), the French Rousseau, Voltaire, Holbach, the German Immanuel Kant (The Critique of 
Practical Reason. 1788), the German Johann Fichte (The System of Ethics. 1798), and the list could go on. 
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through expenditure too. 
 Simplifying the accounting system must limit the possibilities for creative accounting; 
the accounting obligations of micro and small enterprises could be minimized by 
expanding the lump-sum tax so that it ensures only tax control. 
 The international harmonization of national tax systems would limit the possibility of 
tax arbitrage. If various countries had simplified their national tax systems, the 
determination of the tax base of the fewer tax types, the size of tax rates, the scope of 
facilities and exemptions could be approximated so that the sufficient funds principle 
is enforced and tax competition is attenuated. 
 
4. Specific recommendations for stimulating ethical tax-paying 
4.1 The taxpayers’ tax morale depends primarily on the tax-paying willingness of the other 
taxpayers, therefore eliminating the secrecy of individual and family tax returns (tax 
payment) would improve tax-paying willingness. 
Generally, individuals (citizens) can finance their own and their families’ consumption from 
their labor-income after taxes and/or capital income after taxes and/or tax-exempt 
government subsidies (family allowance) or pension. The part of the population’s income in a 
given period not spent on consumption forms the population’s savings which can be used 
later also for consumption. 
The scope of taxpayers and paid tax volume increase: 
 if employment contracts are signed with the illegal (undeclared) employees in 
existing jobs (whitening); 
 the entire income of legal employees in existing jobs (wage + other income) is 
legalized; 
 payment in sales transactions is executed based on an invoice (receipt). 
All three cases can be improved by stricter control, but that would increase the cost of 
control; ethical taxpayers are inconvenienced by more frequent controls. 
It can be assumed – and after implementation, it can be confirmed or refuted – that the 
strongest and least costly means to increasing tax-paying willingness would be publicity, 
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which should be achieved by disclosing the confidential tax returns and tax payments of 
individual taxpayers. Declassifying tax secrets and the public disclosure of the annual tax 
payments of taxpayers would not be a new thing; tax secret has not been around for long in 
our country. Until 1945, the ‘virilists’ (the largest taxpayers) had been the representatives of 
local governments elected from a certain group of taxpayers paying the highest rate of direct 
tax (Vörös, 1979). Of course, declassifying tax secrets would not imply the restoration of 
virilism. Wealth-based privileges rooted in noble privileges cannot be sustained, but public 
tax returns should not be replaced by confidential tax declaration. 
Legal wealth may be acquired by inheritance and the unconsumed part of income after taxes. 
If the income after taxes is known, the source of the individuals’ and families’ wealth 
accretion would be known. Such a system would leave no room for arguments for wealth and 
property tax as a subsequent tax on wealth accrued from untaxed income. 
 
4. 2 Ethical taxation and corruption 
The concept of ethical taxation is most closely related to corruption in the sense that they are 
mutually exclusive terms. Corruption in the Hungarian language means bribery; “An official, 
public, political, moral state in which the practice of bribery and the spirit of bribability are 
widespread.” (A magyar nyelv értelmező szótára, IV. kötet, p. 344 / Dictionary of the 
Hungarian Language, Volume IV, p. 344) As corruption can be associated with official, public 
or political personalities who are bribed, their actions are criminal cases requiring no 
consideration; consequently, corruption is always tax fraud, too, as the income derived from 
corruption cannot be part of the tax base. This means corruption is always a double crime of 
fraud and tax evasion. Without discovering and proving the fraud, the tax evasion cannot be 
discovered, therefore corruption must be limited with all the means possible. 
Numerous opinions, both written and verbal, have been and are still voiced on fighting 
corruption. All governments, governmental control institutions, politicians, governmental 
officials fight corruption at least verbally; the results, according to the experts’ opinions, are 
feeble, which suggests the lack of action or inefficiency of action. If bribery cannot be 
eliminated completely or to a satisfactory level with legal means, then the circumstances 
which allow the possibility of bribery must be inactivated or at least diminished. 
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Corruption is an illegal activity generally involving cash operations. It is the interest of the 
participants of the corruption case to pay cash instead of bank transfers which can prove that 
the financial transaction has been executed. The demand for cash for the movement of funds 
and the significant volume of cash within the volume of funds can probably be explained by 
the demand for cash in corrupt practices (Raciborski-Kürthy, 2010). 
Today, there are no technical limits to the broad expansion of cashless payment. Individuals 
(could) receive their income into bank accounts, can make transfers from their bank accounts 
to others’ (individuals’, public utilities’, institutions’) accounts from the bank branch or even 
from home electronically, and can pay by card for goods and services. Cashless payment is 
widely spread if there are no technical limits to its exclusivity; maintaining cash payments in 
a narrow scope is justified by practical reasons only. What is the cause and explanation for 
the volume of cash in circulation significantly in excess of the “normal” cash demand of 
economy? A certain part of the “excess” cash volume is required by shadow economy 
associated with tax evasion and corrupt or “non-corrupt” tax evasion, while the other part can 
be explained by the sales of common delinquent illegal markets (prostitution, drug or arms 
trade). 
If there is an upper limit of payment in cash per transaction in trade (both on the goods and 
services markets), the cash withdrawals and payments at the bank cash desks are limited per 
transaction, they would result in a cash deficit compared to the volume of cash necessary for 
“financing” corruption, which would hinder i.e. limit corruption, as absurd as this conclusion 
may sound. 
Of course, cash demand can be satisfied with foreign currencies, as well; but the conversion 
involved in the substitution would make the transactions related to the corrupt practice more 
complicated and dangerous, so at least it can have a deterrent effect. The ideal version would 
be to restrict cash payments to a wide scope of countries, or at least to the stable currencies of 
“more reliable” countries. 
Cash payment limits can be set based on practical considerations, changed based on 
experience and occasionally indexed according to the inflation rate. In Hungary, to use an 
example, minimum wage could be a recommended limit. 
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4.3 Gradual limitation of tax havens and offshore areas 
If the taxpayers were obligated to satisfy part or all of the tax liability arisen from their 
economic activity at the real site of the activity, the scope of taxpayers would widen and 
government revenues would increase. Ideally, the companies registered in tax havens or 
offshore areas would pay tax in the countries where the economic activity actually takes 
place. This is conditioned by a wider (complete) international agreement, followed by 
decision and action. The time between the start of the action and completion of the process 
cannot be too big, because the enforcement of a fast-paced movement of the immense (almost 
impossible to estimate) cash volume associated with the tax havens and offshore areas could 
cause unpredictable foreign exchange fluctuations (Péli, 2010). In the less ideal case, at least 
the difference between the tax liability according to the national rates and the tax paid abroad 
should be paid by the taxpayer at the real site of the activity. According to tax experts, 
taxpayers can be compelled to do this even under the current regulations (Brother Layman, 
2011).  
 
5. Summary 
It is society’s common interest to have as many ethical taxpayers and as few tax evaders as 
possible. The goal, albeit not easily and quickly, can be achieved. The strongest and least 
costly means to increasing tax-paying willingness would be publicity, which should be 
achieved by eliminating the confidentiality of tax returns. A least simple and fast means 
would be restricting corruption, fraud and tax evasion. The money movement associated with 
the corrupt practice is executed in cash instead of transfer between bank accounts; therefore 
restricting the amounts which can be paid in cash hinders corruption. A third recommended 
step affects a well-known area. The existence of tax havens and offshores is disadvantageous 
to many countries; eliminating them or at least gradually diminishing them would attenuate 
the disadvantages. If significant results cannot be obtained in the foreseeable future, financing 
the common expenses in the long term becomes impossible. The consequences are 
impossible to predict. 
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